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Abstract. Valuation of environmental goods is a key element in the design of policies that aim 
at sustainable management of natural resources. Yet, adequate pricing is not realized easily as 
the excludability problem makes it difficult to protect natural resources from unpaid use and to 
exercise property rights over them. Moreover, the systems that maintain the regenerative 
capacity of natural resources operate at higher levels than the individual and their management 
necessarily involves collective choice, rather than the use of pure market mechanisms. 
Establishing property rights of natural resources is all the more important since the proceeds 
from these rights can be a substantial factor in poverty alleviation strategies, at both global and 
local level. This paper reviews the techniques that are used in the valuation of environmental 
goods and discusses achievements and limitations of current natural resource policies from the 
point of view of efficiency and equity. We argue that implementation of a trust fund operating 
via market-based transactions is a promising approach to help achieve simultaneously the goals 
of efficiency, sustainability and poverty reduction, provided that property rights over the 
environmental resources are distributed fairly within the generation alive as well as between 
present and future generations. 
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1. Scope of the problem 
The environment contributes to human well-being in a variety of ways, including the supply 
of non-renewable resources such as mineral ores and fossil fuels, of renewable resources such 
as timber and drinking water, and of amenity services such as fresh air for respiration and the 
scenic beauty of landscapes for tourists. Through these contributions it directly produces 
economic value. In addition, it contains resources that are currently in affluent supply but 
could become scarce in the future. Such resources possess a future value referred to as non-
use value (Pearce and Turner, 1990). 
It seems rather obvious that to avoid overuse and undersupply, these contributions 
should be priced adequately as for any other good in the economy. However, in practice the 
use of natural resources is very often free, because protecting them from unpaid use is 
difficult. This problem is known as the excludability issue. The reasons for non-excludability 
differ among resources depending on their physical properties. For fresh air, it is clear that 
one cannot expect every person to pay before breathing, or, more importantly, every company 
to pay before using up the fresh air quality lost through the exhaust of fumes from factory 
chimneys. Hence, exercising property rights is difficult for many of the environmental 
resources, and, conversely, when property rights are not well established over them, few will 
have an interest and be authorized to act as custodian countering depletion and degradation. 
Consequently, the markets for these resources will not function properly. 
This situation is known as the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ (Hardin, 1968), referring to 
communal rangelands in England that persistently suffered from degradation through 
overgrazing, as the livestock owners individually enjoyed the benefits of larger herds without 
having to pay for the forage.  
Primitive human communities only engage in gathering and hunting, and hence, in 
natural resource extraction. As technological skills improve and population pressure keeps on 
rising, sedentary agriculture becomes a necessity, and with it communities turn to the 
management of natural resource regeneration, mainly to maintain fertility of the soils. More 
developed societies have come to recognize that in forestry, fishing and the human habitat at 
large a similar transition is needed.  
However, the management of these regeneration processes differs from regular 
productive activities in that the systems involved are very large and indivisible, and most 
importantly, they cannot be closed down should their operation become unprofitable. In many 
situations, their functioning is complex and full of interactions among multiple stakeholders. 
Such systems operate at a higher level than the individual household or firm (the ‘oikos’ of 
economics) and it is not possible to manage them via pure market mechanisms. They operate 
in a public domain (the ‘polis’ of politics) and their management necessarily involves 
collective choice. Cities, provinces and nations have very similar properties and, 
consequently, many useful lessons can be learnt from these fields, specifically from urban 
management and public administration, to avoid tragedies of the commons.  
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Indeed, for oceans, rangelands or irrigated lands it would, like for cities, be highly 
improductive to parcel out the whole territory into privately owned units, and public authority 
is needed that can co-ordinate the decisions of all stakeholders and reward their contributions. 
River-basin authorities are examples of such institutions. In practice, a combination of public 
institutions and private firms tailored to the specific local condition is most likely to be 
effective (e.g. Matsaert et al., 2007), where the public institutions are in charge of the 
definition of terms-of-reference, selection of the private supplier of the services, and 
monitoring of the quality of the services provided. 
Yet, irrespective of the institutional arrangement chosen two questions have to be 
addressed: first, how free use can be avoided, and second, who the owner should be to whom 
payment is to be made. Seriously addressing both questions becomes more urgent every day, 
especially because several environmental resources are only renewable as long as stocks 
remain above critical thresholds1, below which irreversible processes set in leading, among 
others, to the extinction of species and the loss of cultivable land. Furthermore, fair 
distribution of property rights could be a powerful vehicle in the fight against poverty, since it 
would be natural to let the poor share in these rights. 
 
2. Natural resource management 
Generally, natural resource management aims at ensuring that resource stocks are conserved 
in sufficient quantities for the future generations. With respect to non-renewable resources 
such as fossil fuels, these policies will obviously have to settle for a certain amount of 
depletion, but this is defensible in the understanding that there always will be sufficient 
energy from the sun and the oceans, and possibly from nuclear fusion available to let future 
generations live a comfortable life, provided current generations make sufficient investments 
in knowledge and new technologies. Indeed, natural resource policies tend to focus on 
renewable resources so as to keep them productive and to protect their regeneration capacity 
by keeping their stocks above critical levels. Current concerns about climate change are a 
case in point.  
In addition, richer segments in the population are increasingly willing to pay for 
resource amenities of natural parks and historical landscapes, both as tourists and as 
custodians of natural and cultural heritage.  
Nature conservation also has important “option value”, because it maintains the 
genetic biodiversity of species. The genetic resource pool is of particular importance for 
agriculture since crop cultivation, even in the age of advanced bio-technology, still has to rely 
on it to maintain productivity be it through breeding or through implantation of genes via 
genetic engineering. 
 To address these various concerns, several government policies have been put in place 
worldwide, most of which are designed to simulate what the market would do, had the 
 
 
5
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
excludability problems been resolved and had adequate property rights been introduced. In 
the sequel, we suppose that the excludability question can be appropriately dealt with. Indeed, 
modern statistical techniques, satellite imagery, GPS and information processing devices 
greatly ease the task of coming up with reasonable estimates of the use of natural resources 
by individuals, making it possible for authorities in charge to settle the accounts, in 
technically more developed regions through individual taxation, and elsewhere through 
transfers at community level. Generally, most natural resource policies are still at the stage of 
simulating a well functioning market by means of dedicated planning procedures, using as 
policy instruments a mix of quantitative restrictions that limit the use of the natural resource, 
and taxes on use. Clearly successful implementation of these policies should account for 
gender related decision making processes as, for example in Africa, the prospects for 
improving sustainable environments are positively correlated to women’s increasing 
influence in natural resource management (Thomas-Slayter and Sodikoff, 2001). 
Among the quantitative restrictions, the strict conservationist measures are the most far-
reaching. They are proposed for resources that are deemed essential to the well-being of 
future generations and whose renewability is very limited. In the natural resource 
management literature, these measures are being advocated from the perspective of ensuring 
“strong sustainability”2 of environmental functions that cannot be substituted for by human 
capital or man-made goods3. For example, few will agree that a nice poem on a nature resort 
or a 3D-movie of this resort can substitute for an actual visit to that resort. Under strict 
conservation, resource stocks and environmental quality are to be kept at their current levels 
(Brekke, 1997) through legislation that bans all use. Less strict conservation allows for 
limited use and relies on licensing and user quotas as instruments (e.g. emission permits for 
the use of clean air and clean water).  
While powerful in principle as a means to prevent resource exhaustion, quantitative 
restrictions tend to be less efficient economically, as they restrict individual people in making 
their choices according to their own preferences and hence hamper the proper functioning of 
the free market. Yet, these restrictions may be conceived of as a means for allowing future 
generations to exercise demand for natural resources on present-day markets but then again, 
there is no way of asking these generations how much they appreciate this intervention. 
Taxation of resource use is another way of restricting use and leaves more room for 
choice by the present generation. It can ensure that the natural resource use carries a positive 
cost, making resource extraction less attractive and supply more attractive, while promoting 
the development of close substitutes. Specifically, Pigovian taxes aim at keeping taxation at 
the level of the market price that the resource would fetch under perfect conditions, had all 
 
1 The critical threshold is the minimum size of a natural resource to maintain its own existence. 
2 Strong sustainability is opposed to weak sustainability that allows for substitution of natural capital by 
manufactured capital. 
3 The ozone layer is one example of an ecosystem service that is difficult for humans to duplicate. 
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causes of market failure such as excludability and joint use been eliminated. Hence, under 
Pigovian taxation, the tax levels imposed reflect the individual willingness to pay for negative 
externalities, while the proceeds are available to finance environmental protection. 
As Pigovian taxation attributes a price to all resource use, and through this to all 
supply flows as well as to all stock levels, it in principle solves the problem of natural 
resource valuation but only in principle. In practice, the difficulties are on the one hand that it 
may not be easy even to approximate these ideal levels of taxation, and on the other that the 
present generation may not be willing to pay this tax. 
To deal with the first issue, various techniques have been developed (see Box). 
Examples of use value approaches are production function analysis and defensive 
expenditures. Both methods rely on the existence of market prices for end-users of natural 
resources, yet, they are based on different principles by focussing on the revenues and the 
cost side, respectively. Conceptually, the most attractive way to conduct valuation based on 
use value would presumably be to incorporate all the information collected within a 
simulation model with a detailed representation of the dynamic and geographic dimensions of 
the relevant biophysical processes and stock balances in an intertemporal welfare framework. 
A recent study by Albersen et al. (2003) conducted in this spirit but with ample 
simplification, shows how upstream prices and values can be assigned to water flows and 
stocks, on the basis of upward calculation, starting from the economic benefit obtained by 
downstream users. Yet, the drawback of this type of modeling is that it needs vast amounts of 
statistical measurement and process knowledge, which, all cost issues aside, are simply not 
available for many branches of natural resource management. Hence, the frequent appeal to 
the precautionary principle, whereby strict conservationism and prohibitively high taxes are 
being advocated to avoid uncertain but possibly irreversible damage. 
The surrogate markets approach is somewhat subjective with respect to the reference 
variables used in the comparison, which may, moreover, be correlated with non-
environmental values. For example, comparing real-estate prices on the basis of the parks in 
the neighborhood would grossly exaggerate the contribution of these parks to the prices of 
houses, because presence of a park is likely to be correlated with many other qualities of 
municipal services provided to a neighborhood. 
The stated-preference methods have the disadvantage that on the one hand interviews 
may be distorted by strategic biases of respondents, lack of commitment to actually pay the 
price communicated in the poll, and insufficient coverage of the poll, and on the other hand 
experimental designs may not be suited to capture the real life situation. Yet, in many 
situations, for example when development of a completely new park or of a new regime of 
ecological management are being considered, or when non-use is the actual aim, these less 
precise techniques have to be relied upon.  
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Box: Methods of natural resource valuation 
 
• Use Value  
When a natural resource has well defined end uses, say, timber, drinking water and tourism for a 
forest, each with a functioning market, the resource valuation can be imputed from the prevailing 
market prices of these end-uses. 
 
o The production function method identifies the marginal contribution of the natural 
resource to the production of a marketed commodity: e.g. water to crop production (e.g. 
Freeman, 2003; Archaya and Barbier, 2002). 
o The defensive expenditure method assigns a price to a natural resource equal to the cost 
of maintaining its productivity by curing damage from emissions of pollutants and 
resource degradation (e.g. Tiezzi, 2002).  
 
• Surrogate Markets: 
In the absence of a functioning market for an end-use, surrogate markets may be referred to:  
 
o The hedonic pricing method values the presence of natural resources e.g. by comparing 
prices of houses with otherwise similar characteristics under different environmental 
conditions (e.g. Taylor and Smith, 2000). 
o  The travel cost method, measures the value of a recreational site by surveying travelers 
on the economic costs they incur when visiting the site from some distance away (e.g. 
Pendleton and Mendelsohn, 2000).  
 
• Stated preferences: 
Alternatively, communication with stakeholders may provide additional information 
 
o  The contingent valuation method elicits information on willingness to pay from survey 
questionnaires and interviews (e.g. Kolstad, 2000; Mitchell and Carson, 1989).  
o The conjoint stated preference methods undertake experiments involving contingent 
ranking, or contingent choice, among alternatives that provide different levels of non-
market goods (e.g. Roe et al. 1996).  
 
Leaving aside the technical difficulties in obtaining Pigovian taxes, the current interest 
in establishing property rights4 over environmental resources seems to result mainly from the 
growing understanding that markets do not function well with taxes alone. Private property 
rights are needed to let the private sector perceive free use of natural resources as a form of 
robbery. Moreover, it appears that the sums at stake to pay the owners might be substantial. 
Indeed, under appropriate pricing and given the vital role of environmental services in the 
world economy, the sustainable management of the natural base could become a highly 
 
4 Property rights should be secure, indefinite, enforceable and legally transferable (Panayotou, 1992). 
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profitable venture. For example, though such calculations obviously remain debatable, it is 
noteworthy that Costanza et al. (1997) estimate the present value of the (potentially 
indefinite) stream of environmental services at up to 54 trillion US dollars in 1997 
worldwide.  
However, distribution of property rights is not an easy task. First, as mentioned earlier, 
the excludability problem is firmly anchored in the biophysical nature of the processes at 
stake. For instance, under traditional conditions the partitioning of a pastoral dryland among 
multiple stakeholders is not a viable option, as the herds have to migrate with the seasons. 
The same applies to river basins, forests and oceans. Second, conservation of natural 
resources usually requires intervention at higher administrative levels, basically because the 
high set-up costs of degradation control and infrastructural development cannot be borne by 
individuals. Third, sustainability requires that future generations receive a sufficiently large 
share of the property rights. There is need for an institution that can represent their interests. 
Finally, the distribution of property rights may have serious implications for equity and social 
stability, when the poor are denied access to previously common resources, whereas more 
powerful groups reap the benefits from the newly created rights. We consider these four 
pitfalls, starting with the last one. 
 
3. Distribution of the proceeds from environmental resource use 
The concern for intergenerational equity that motivates natural resource valuation should not 
dwarf the concern for intra-generational equity. Hence, the issue should be addressed as to 
whom the payment should be made within the present generation (Keyzer and Van Veen, 
1997). Current practice essentially follows the principle of occupation, whereby the property 
over the resource is attributed to its current users. This is highly to the advantage of the rich 
nations. For example, by distributing emission rights of pollutants (the bads) rather than the 
clean air (the good) itself, the Kyoto agreement on mitigation of greenhouse gases attributes 
property rights in proportion of use. Specifically, the agreement implies that the Pigovian-like 
ecotaxes currently paid by the private sector in each country eventually accrue to the owners of 
the CO2-emission permits. These are largely the public sectors of the polluting countries 
themselves, but the agreement also allows for international trade in permits (joint 
implementation), while countries that grow new forests or provide other additional sinks of 
greenhouse gases are rewarded financially. 
Instead of assigning the emission rights to the polluting countries it would seem more 
natural and fair to entitle all human beings to an equal share in these permits, since no 
individual or state has so far established sovereign rights over the climatic ecosystem. Such a 
distribution would most likely benefit the poor, who spend relatively little on energy-intensive 
goods, and would, therefore, earn more from selling their emission rights than they spend on 
emission taxes via the tax-inclusive price of the goods they purchase. Hence, they would 
derive a positive net revenue from the arrangement. Clearly, it would be difficult to set up a 
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system of payments that reaches every individual on earth but for those who are unable to 
participate directly, some collective arrangement could be established. In this way, everyone 
could be assured of a basic income. This also establishes a strong link between poverty 
alleviation and environmental policies and makes it attractive for the poor to support policies 
that preserve the environment. In addition to receiving positive net transfers, as they spend less 
on emissions than they are entitled to, they would also find it rewarding to produce non-fossil 
energy and to engage in activities that ensure absorption of greenhouse gases. 
 
4. Maintaining intergenerational equity: a trust fund approach 
Even if competitive markets could be established for all natural resources, and a full system 
of property rights could be introduced, serious environmental degradation might persist, 
essentially because present generations are by necessity the ones to decide (Pezzey, 1992). 
Mourmouras (1993) and Krautkraemer and Batina (1999) have studied the implications of 
this principle of ‘grandfathering’, whereby man-made and natural capital are initially given in 
exclusive property to the generation that happens to be alive and that sells the capital it owns 
to its successor in order to provide for old age, and so on in every period. After showing that 
this savings mechanism might be insufficient to prevent a gradual reduction in human 
welfare, these authors argue that the economic analysis of equitable resource use has to 
advance beyond the efficiency argument, as in Bromley (1990).  
One possible answer could be that it still is possible to prevent such a welfare decline 
by resorting to the strictly conservationist ‘zero extraction’ measures discussed earlier but this 
would go at the expense of efficiency, while the Pigovian taxes that aim at addressing this 
issue were seen to have their limitations as well (Howarth, 1998). To combine dynamic 
efficiency with sustainability, one would need a transfer mechanism that redistributes income 
among generations while the market would generate the prices. To this end, Gerlagh and 
Keyzer (2001) have suggested creating a fund that can act as trustee for future generations 
and in which present generations are represented as well. To avoid disagreement about  
management and distribution, this fund would entitle all individual members of present and 
future generations to an equal claim over natural resource use during their lifetime. Through 
net transfers, this trust fund would offer compensation in line with the Polluters Pay 
Principle: a generation using more of the resource than its entitlement will have to 
compensate future generations for the degraded environment they have to live in by leaving 
more man-made capital as bequest, and conversely. Being market-based, that is computing 
the transfers on the basis of the market prices of the resources, the trust fund would be as 
efficient as grandfathering while protecting the welfare of future generations.  
In this way, the trust fund approach presents several advantages: (i) it can maintain 
common property over natural resources that can not easily be distributed over individual 
owners and, nonetheless, operates via market-based transactions, (ii) it can help achieve 
simultaneously the objectives of dynamic efficiency and sustainability, (iii) it tends to raise 
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the income of the poor whose share in resource ownership will generally exceed that in 
resource use, also because the resource pricing will reward resource regeneration activities, 
(iv) it operates by contractual arrangements whereby all owners including future generations 
are represented with clear claims, and (v) it has a flexible setup: stakeholders in the use of a 
particular resource may form a dedicated club, with the special feature that future generations 
are being represented in its rules and regulations and that the property rights are not limited to 
users.  
Thus, it might seem that the fund has an answer to each of the four pitfalls listed earlier. 
Indeed, for resources that the poor consume in small quantities, such as clean air, the 
arrangement might work. However, for other resources, a large number of hurdles would 
have to be overcome for the fund to function well in practice. For example, consider a case of 
soil degradation by water erosion in an area occupied mainly by poor farmers owning small 
plots of land. Under these conditions, the farmers already are the owners of the main natural 
resource they depend on. Nonetheless, given their day-to-day pressure to survive, they will 
often be forced to ignore their losses of top-soil from rains and of soil-fertility from 
insufficient replenishment of nutrients. In such situations, explicit conservation schemes are 
called for to prevent further resource degradation, as a complement to the market mechanisms 
upon which the trust fund will tend to rely.   
Yet, if the trust fund was to generate sufficient revenue for these empoverished 
population groups, this might enable them to adopt a more long-term perspective and to 
relieve the pressure on the land, say, by purchasing fertilizers to replenish the soil, by 
building terraces to prevent erosion, by investing in non-farm activities, and by purchasing 
food on the market from the transfers received. Furthermore, a government recognizing the 
public interest of protecting the scenery of the region might be willing to co-sponsor 
conservation projects that would in turn offer additional employment to the farmers 
concerned. Thus, rewarding resource owners for their role as custodians is an important 
mechanism for simultaneously alleviating poverty and conserving natural resources (Carter 
and Currie-Alder, 2006). The successful participation of local communities in protecting the 
national parks of South Africa is a promising example in this respect.  
 
5. Conclusion 
To sum up, despite the many problems of implementation, the trust fund approach seems a 
promising one, and might offer a powerful device to help achieve simultaneously the goals of 
efficiency, sustainability and poverty reduction. Basic to the approach is recognition of the 
principles that environmental resources should be priced adequately and that property rights 
over them should be distributed fairly within the generation alive as well as between present 
and future generations. Yet, putting these principles into practice is not easy. Resource pricing 
requires the excludability problems to have been addressed satisfactorily, and even then 
additional policy instruments may have to be relied upon, because the underlying 
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environmental processes are often lumpy, indivisible and characterized by thresholds below 
which irreversible processes lead, for example, to reduced biodiversity and loss of top soils. In 
such situations, conservationist measures have to be resorted to, implemented either through 
quantity restrictions or through Pigovian taxes, both computed through dedicated planning 
procedures. Finally, even with the trust fund and all the planning apparatus in place, the 
strategies can only succeed as long as the current generation is willing to accept the sacrifice 
involved. Hence, not surprisingly, political will, rather than technical feasibility, appears to be 
the major bottleneck in the end. 
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